


MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Unwilling Testing


1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph 5.

2.

 I am sure you are also aware of several other indications during the past year of an apparent Soviet aggressiveness in the field of covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplicable and disturbing.

3. I wish to remind you that our testing program which deals with unwitting persons has been in a stand down status for over one year. Two points concern me regarding this stand down:

- a. Our positive operational capability to use drugs is diminishing, owing to a lack of realistic testing. We are approaching the point where the operational target itself becomes the test subject.



APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 17 January 1981

b. With decreasing knowledge of the state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet advances in this field. This in turn results in a waning capability on our part to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations in this area.

4. As we understand it, our testing of unwitting persons was halted on the grounds that in spite of the cut out mechanism (Narcotics Bureau), the risks of embarrassment to the Agency, coupled with the moral problem were too great to permit continuation of the program. We have been unable to devise a better method of pursuing such a program than the one we have with the Narcotics Bureau which has been completely secure for over eight years and we have no answer to the moral issue.

5. While I personally believe we should continue our testing program, I can well understand the apprehension and concern expressed by others. I feel, however, that either continuation of the program or a definitive cancellation of it are better solutions than the status quo. As matters now stand, we are living with the illusion of a capability which is becoming minimal and furthermore is expensive. If we are to terminate this capability (which includes a certain amount of research and development, procurement of items, etc.) we could probably save about \$500,000 annually. Since we strongly believe that without testing of unwitting persons, the program tends to lose its meaning, I recommend that:

- a. We resume the testing program immediately, or
- b. We withdraw from the field of manipulation of human behavior by covertly administered chemicals.



Your approval of either of the alternatives cited above is requested.

*Richard Helms*

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans

Recommendation contained in  
paragraph 5.a. is approved:

Recommendation contained in  
paragraph 5.b. is approved:

Director of Central Intelligence